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By their fruits ye shall know them.
Enough. The living will has failed, and it is timeto say so. 
We should have known it would fail: A notable
but neglected psychological literature always provid-
ed arresting reasons to expect the policy of living
wills to misfire. Given their alluring potential, per-
haps they were worth trying. But a crescendoing em-
pirical literature and persistent clinical disappoint-
ments reveal that the rewards of the campaign to
promote living wills do not justify its costs. Nor can
any degree of tinkering ever make the living will an
effective instrument of social policy.
As the evidence of failure has mounted, living
wills have lost some of their friends. We offer sys-
tematic support for their change of heart. But living
wills are still widely and confidently urged on pa-
tients, and they retain the allegiance of many
bioethicists, doctors, nurses, social workers, and pa-
tients. For these loyal advocates, we offer systematic
proof that such persistence in error is but the tri-
umph of dogma over inquiry and hope over experi-
ence.
A note about the scope of our contentions: First,
we reject only living wills, not durable powers of at-
torney. Second, there are excellent reasons to be
skeptical of living wills on principle. For example,
perhaps former selves should not be able to bind lat-
ter selves in the ways living wills contemplate.1 And
many people do and perhaps should reject the view
of patients, their families, and their communities
that informs living wills.2 But we accept for the sake
of argument that living wills desirably serve a strong
version of patients’ autonomy. We contend, never-
theless, that living wills do not and cannot achieve
that goal.
And a stipulation: We do not propose the elimi-
nation of living wills. We can imagine recommend-
ing them to patients whose medical situation is
plain, whose crisis is imminent, whose preferences
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are specific, strong, and delineable,
and who have special reasons to pre-
scribe their care. We argue on the
level of public policy: In an attempt
to extend patients’ exercise of autono-
my beyond their span of competence,
resources have been lavished to make
living wills routine and even univer-
sal. This policy has not produced re-
sults that recompense its costs, and it
should therefore be renounced.
Living wills are a bioethical idea
that has passed from controversy to
conventional wisdom, from the coun-
sel of academic journals to the com-
mands of law books, from professors’
proposal to professional practice. Ad-
vance directives generally are embod-
ied in federal policy by the Patient
Self-Determination Act, which re-
quires medical institutions to give pa-
tients information about their state’s
advance directives. In turn, the law of
every state provides for advance direc-
tives, almost all states provide for liv-
ing wills, and most states “have at
least two statutes, one establishing a
living will type directive, the other es-
tablishing a proxy or durable power
of attorney for health care.”3 Not only
are all these statutes very much in ef-
fect, but new legislative activity is
constant. Senators Rockefeller,
Collins, and Specter have introduced
bills to “strengthen” the PSDA and
living wills,4 and state legislatures
continue to amend living will statutes
and to enact new ones. 
Courts and administrative agen-
cies too have become advocates of liv-
ing wills. The Veterans Administra-
tion has proposed a rule to encourage
the use of advance directives, includ-
ing living wills.5 Where legislatures
have not granted living wills legal sta-
tus, some courts have done so as a
matter of common law, and where
legislatures have granted them legal
status, courts have cooperated with
eager enthusiasm.6 Living wills have
assumed special importance in states
that prohibit terminating treatment
in the absence of strong evidence of
the patient’s wishes.7 One supreme
court summarized a common theme:
“[A] written directive would provide
the most concrete evidence of the pa-
tient’s decisions, and we strongly urge
all persons to create such a directive.”8
The grandees of law and medicine
also give their benediction to the liv-
ing will. The AMA’s Council on Eth-
ical and Judicial Affairs proclaims:
“Physicians should encourage their
patients to document their treatment
preferences or to appoint a health care
proxy with whom they can discuss
their values regarding health care and
treatment.”9 The elite National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws continues to pro-
mulgate the Uniform Health-Care
Decisions Act, a prestigious model
statute that has been put into law in a
still-growing number of states. Med-
ical journals regularly admonish doc-
tors and nurses to see that patients
have advance directives, including liv-
ing wills.10 Bar journals regularly ad-
monish lawyers that their clients—all
their clients—need advance direc-
tives, including living wills.11 Re-
searchers demonstrate their convic-
tion that living wills are important by
the persistence of their studies of pa-
tients’ attitudes toward living wills
and ways of inveigling patients to sign
them.
Not only do legislatures, courts,
administrative agencies, and profes-
sional associations promote the living
will, but other groups unite with
them. The Web abounds in sites ad-
vocating the living will to patients.12
The web site for our university’s hos-
pital plugs advance directives and
suggests that it “is probably better to
have written instructions because
then everyone can read them and un-
derstand your wishes.”13
Our own experience in presenting
this paper is that its thesis provokes
some bioethicists to disbelief and in-
dignation. It is as though they simply
cannot bear to believe that living wills
might not work. How can anything
so intuitively right be proved so infu-
riatingly wrong? And indeed, bioethi-
cists continue to investigate ways the
living will might be extended (to deal
with problems of the mentally ill and
of minors, for example) and devel-
oped for other countries.
Although some sophisticated ob-
servers have long doubted the wis-
dom of living wills,14 proponents
have tended to respond in one of
three ways, all of which preserve an
important role for living wills. First,
proponents have supposed that the
principal problem with living wills is
that people just won’t sign them.
These proponents have persevered in
the struggle to find ways of getting
more people to sign up.15
Second, proponents have reassert-
ed the usefulness of the living wills.
For example, Norman Cantor, distin-
gusted advocate of living wills, ac-
knowledges that “(s)ome commenta-
tors doubt the utility or efficacy of
advance directives,” (by which he
If after so much propaganda so few of us have living wills, do we really want
them, or are we just saying what we think we ought to think and what 
investigators want to hear?
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means the living will), but he con-
cludes that “these objections don’t ob-
viate the importance of advance di-
rectives.”16 Other proponents are
daunted by the criticisms of living
wills but offer new justifications for
them. Linda Emanuel, another emi-
nent exponent of living wills, writes
that “living wills can help doctors and
patients talk about dying” and can
thereby “open the door to a positive,
caring approach to death.”17
Third, some proponents concede
the weaknesses of the living will and
the advantages of the durable power
of attorney and then propose a
durable power of attorney that incor-
porates a living will. That is, the
forms they propose for establishing a
durable power of attorney invite their
authors to provide the kinds of in-
structions formerly confined to living
wills.18
None of these responses fully grap-
ples with the whole range of difficul-
ties that confound the policy promot-
ing living wills. In fairness, this is
partly because the case against that
policy has been made piecemeal and
not in a full-fledged and full-throated
analysis of the empirical literature on
living wills.
In sum, the law has embraced the
principle of living wills and cheerfully
continues to this moment to expound
and expand that principle. Doctors,
nurses, hospitals, and lawyers are
daily urged to convince their patients
and clients to adopt living wills, and
patients hear their virtues from many
other sources besides. Some advocates
of living wills have shifted the
grounds for their support of living
wills, but they persist in believing that
they are useful. The time has come to
investigate those policies and those
hopes systematically. That is what this
article attempts.
We ask an obvious but unasked
question: What would it take for a
regime of living wills to function as
their advocates hope? First, people
must have living wills. Second, they
must decide what treatment they
would want if incompetent. Third,
they must accurately and lucidly state
that preference. Fourth, their living
wills must be available to people mak-
ing decisions for a patient. Fifth,
those people must grasp and heed the
living will’s instructions. These condi-
tions are unmet and largely un-
meetable.
Do People Have Living Wills?
At the level of principle, livingwills have triumphed among the
public as among the princes of medi-
cine. People widely say they want a
living will, and living wills have so
much become conventional medical
wisdom “that involvement in the
process is being portrayed as a duty to
physicians and others.”19 Despite this,
and despite decades of urging, most
Americans lack them.20 While most
of us who need one have a property
will, roughly 18 percent have living
wills.21 The chronically or terminally
ill are likelier to prepare living wills
than the healthy, but even they do so
fitfully.22 In one study of dialysis pa-
tients, for instance, only 35 percent
had a living will, even though all of
them thought living wills a “good
idea.”23
Why do people flout the conven-
tional wisdom? The flouters advance
many explanations.24 They don’t
know enough about living wills,25
they think living wills hard to exe-
cute,26 they procrastinate,27 they hesi-
tate to broach the topic to their doc-
tors (as their doctors likewise hesi-
tate).28 Some patients doubt they
need a living will. Some think living
wills are for the elderly or infirm and
count themselves in neither group.29
Others suspect that living wills do not
change the treatment people receive;
91 percent of the veterans in one
study shared that suspicion.30 Many
patients are content or even anxious
to delegate decisions to their fami-
lies,31 often because they care less
what decisions are made than that
they are made by people they trust.
Some patients find living wills incom-
patible with their cultural traditions.32
Thus in the large SUPPORT and
HELP studies, most patients pre-
ferred to leave final resuscitation deci-
sions to their family and physician in-
stead of having their own preferences
expressly followed (70.8% in HELP
and 78.0% in SUPPORT). “This re-
sult is so striking that it is worth re-
stating: not even a third of the HELP
patients and hardly more than a fifth
of the SUPPORT patients “would
want their own preferences fol-
lowed.”33
If people lacked living wills only
because of ignorance, living wills
might proliferate with education. But
studies seem not to “support the spec-
ulations found in the literature that
the low level of advance directives use
is due primarily to a lack of informa-
tion and encouragement from health
care professionals and family mem-
bers.”34 Rather, there is considerable
evidence “that the elderly’s action of
delaying execution of advance direc-
tives and deferring to others is a delib-
erate, if not an explicit, refusal to par-
ticipate in the advance directives
process.”35
The federal government has
sought to propagate living wills
through the Patient Self-Determina-
tion Act,36 which essentially requires
medical institutions to inform pa-
tients about advance directives. How-
ever, “empirical studies demonstrate
that: the PSDA has generally failed to
foster a significant increase in advance
directives use; it is being implemented
by medical institutions and their per-
sonnel in a passive manner; and the
involvement of physicians in its im-
plementation is lacking.”37 One com-
mentator even thinks “the PSDA’s
legal requirements have become a
ceiling instead of a floor.”38
In short, people have reasons,
often substantial and estimable rea-
sons, for eschewing living wills, rea-
sons unlikely to be overcome by per-
suasion. Indeed, persuasion seems
quickly to find its limits. Numerous
studies indicate that without consid-
erable intervention, approximately 20
percent of us complete living wills,
but programs to propagate wills have
mixed results.39 Some have achieved
significant if still limited increases in
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the completion of living wills,40 while
others have quite failed to do so.41
Thus we must ask: If after so
much propaganda so few of us have
living wills, do we really want them,
or are we just saying what we think
we ought to think and what investiga-
tors want to hear?
Do People Know What They
Will Want?
Suppose, counterfactually, that peo-ple executed living wills. For those
documents to work, people would
have to predict their preferences accu-
rately. This is an ambitious demand.
Even patients making contemporary
decisions about contemporary illness-
es are regularly daunted by the deci-
sions’ difficulty. They are human. We
humans falter in gathering informa-
tion, misunderstand and ignore what
we gather, lack well-considered pref-
erences to guide decisions, and rush
headlong to choice.42 How much
harder, then, is it to conjure up pref-
erences for an unspecifiable future
confronted with unidentifiable mal-
adies with unpredictable treatments?
For example, people often misap-
prehend crucial background facts
about their medical choices. Oregon
has made medical policy in fresh and
controversial ways, has recently had
two referenda on assisted suicide, and
alone has legalized it. Presumably,
then, its citizens are especially knowl-
edgeable. But only 46 percent of
them knew that patients may legally
withdraw life-sustaining treatment.
Even experience is a poor teacher:
“Personal experience with illness . . .
and authoring an advance directive 
. . . were not significantly associated
with better knowledge about op-
tions.”43
Nor do people reliably know
enough about illnesses and treatments
to make prospective life-or-death de-
cisions about them. To take one ex-
ample from many, people grossly
overestimate the effectiveness of CPR
and in fact hardly know what it is.44
For such information, people must
rely on doctors. But doctors convey
that information wretchedly even to
competent patients making contem-
poraneous decisions. Living wills can
be executed without even consulting
a doctor,45 and when doctors are con-
sulted, the conversations are ordinari-
ly short, vague, and tendentious. In
the Tulsky study, for example, doctors
only described either “dire scenarios
. . . in which few people, terminally ill
or otherwise, would want treatment”
or “situations in which patients could
recover with proper treatment.”46
Let us put the point differently.
The conventional—legal and ethical
wisdom—insists that candidates for
even a flu shot give “informed con-
sent.” And that wisdom has increas-
ingly raised the standards for disclo-
sure.47 If we applied those standards
to the information patients have be-
fore making the astonishing catalog
of momentous choices living wills can
embody, the conventional wisdom
would be left shivering with indigna-
tion.
Not only do people regularly
know too little when they sign a liv-
ing will, but often (again, we’re
human) they analyze their choices
only superficially before placing them
in the time capsule. An ocean of evi-
dence affirms that answers are shaped
by the way questions are asked. Pref-
erences about treatments are influ-
enced by factors like whether success
or failure rates are used,48 the level of
detail employed,49 and whether long-
or short-term consequences are ex-
plained first.50 Thus in one study,
“201 elderly subjects opted for the in-
tervention 12% of the time when it
was presented negatively, 18% of the
time when it was phrased as in an ad-
vance directive already in use, and
30% of the time when it was phrased
positively. Seventy-seven percent of
the subjects changed their minds at
least once when given the same case
scenario but a different description of
the intervention.”51
If patients have trouble with con-
temporaneous decisions, how much
more trouble must they have with
prospective ones. For such decisions
to be “true,” patients’ preferences
must be reasonably stable. Surprising-
ly often, they are not. A famous study
of eighteen women in a “natural
childbirth” class found that prefer-
ences about anesthesia and avoiding
pain were relatively stable before
childbirth, but at “the beginning of
active labor (4-5 cm dilation) there
was a shift in the preference toward
avoiding labor pains. . . . During the
transition phase of labor (8-10cm)
Even patients making contemporary decisions about contemporary
illnesses are regularly daunted by the decisions’ difficulty. How much harder,
then, is it to conjure up preferences for an unspecifiable future confronted
with unidentifiable maladies with unpredictable treatments?
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the values remained relatively stable,
but then . . . the mothers’ preferences
shifted again at postpartum toward
avoiding the use of anesthesia during
the delivery of her next child.”52 And
not only are preferences surprisingly
labile, but people have trouble recog-
nizing that their views have
changed.53 This makes it less likely
they will amend their living wills as
their opinions develop and more like-
ly that their living wills will treaso-
nously misrepresent their wishes.
Instability matters. The healthy
may incautiously prefer death to dis-
ability. Once stricken, competent pa-
tients can test and reject that prefer-
ence. They often do.54 Thus Wilfrid
Sheed “quickly learned [that] cancer,
even more than polio, has a disarm-
ing way of bargaining downward, be-
ginning with your whole estate and
then letting you keep the game war-
den’s cottage or badminton court;
and by the time it has tried to fright-
en you to death and threatened to
take away your very existence, you’d
be amazed at how little you’re willing
to settle for.”55
At least sixteen studies have inves-
tigated the stability of people’s prefer-
ences for life-sustaining treatment.56
A meta-analysis of eleven of these
studies found that the stability of pa-
tients’ preferences was 71 percent (the
range was 57 percent to 89 per-
cent).57 Although stability depended
on numerous factors (including the
illness, the treatment, and demo-
graphic variables), the bottom line is
that, over periods as short as two
years, almost one-third of preferences
for life-sustaining medical treatment
changed. More particularly, illness
and hospitalization change people’s
preferences for life-sustaining treat-
ments.58 In a prospective study, the
desire for life-sustaining treatment
declined significantly after hospital-
ization but returned almost to its
original level three to six months
later.59 Another study concluded that
the “will to live is highly unstable
among terminally ill cancer pa-
tients.”60 The authors thought their
findings “perhaps not surprising,
given that only 10-14% of individu-
als who survive a suicide attempt
commit suicide during the next 10
years, which suggests that a desire to
die is inherently changeable.”
The consistent finding that inter-
est in life-sustaining treatment shifts
over time and across contexts coin-
cides tellingly with research charting
people’s struggles to predict their own
tastes, behavior, and emotions even
over short periods and under familiar
circumstances.61 People mispredict
what poster they will like,62 how
much they will buy at the grocery
store,63 how sublimely they will enjoy
an ice cream,64 and how they will ad-
just to tenure decisions.65 And people
“miswant” for numerous reasons.66
They imagine a different event from
the one that actually occurs, nurture
inaccurate theories about what gives
them pleasure,67 forget they might
outwit misery, concentrate on salient
negative events and ignore offsetting
happier ones,68 and misgauge the ef-
fect of physiological sensations like
pain.69 Given this rich stew of re-
search on people’s missteps in pre-
dicting their tastes generally, we
should expect misapprehensions
about end-of-life preferences. Indeed,
those preferences should be especially
volatile, since people lack experience
deciding to die.
Can People Articulate What
They Want?
Suppose, arguendo, that patientsregularly made sound choices
about future treatments and write liv-
ing wills. Can they articulate their
choices accurately? This question is
crucially unrealistic, of course, be-
cause the assumption is false. People
have trouble reaching well-considered
decisions, and you cannot state clear-
ly on paper what is muddled in your
mind. And indeed people do, for in-
stance, issue mutually inconsistent
instructions in living wills.70
But assume this difficulty away
and the problem of articulation per-
sists. In one sense, the best way to di-
vine patients’ preferences is to have
them write their own living wills to
give surrogates the patient’s gloriously
unmediated voice. This is not a prac-
tical policy. Too many people are
functionally illiterate,71 and most of
the literate cannot express themselves
clearly in writing. It’s hard, even for
the expert writer. Furthermore, most
people know too little about their
choices to cover all the relevant sub-
jects. Hence living wills are generally
forms that demand little writing. But
the forms have failed. For example,
“several studies suggest that even
those patients who have completed
AD forms . . . may not fully under-
stand the function of the form or its
language.”72 Living wills routinely
baffle patients with their
“syntactic complexity, concept
density, abstractness, organization,
coherence, sequence of ideas, page
format, length of line of print,
length of paragraph, punctuation,
illustrations, color, and reader in-
terest.” Unfortunately, most ad-
vance directive forms . . . often
have neither a reasonable scope
nor depth. They do not ask all the
right questions and they do not
ask those questions in a manner
that elicits clear responses.73
Doctors and lawyers who believe
their clients are all above average
should ask them what their living will
says. One of us (CES) has tried the
experiment. The modal answer is, in
its entirety: “It says I don’t want to be
a vegetable.”
No doubt the forms could be im-
proved, but not enough to matter.
The world abounds in dreadfully
drafted forms because writing com-
plex instructions for the future is
crushingly difficult. Statutes read
horribly because their authors are
struggling to (1) work out exactly
what rule they want, (2) imagine all
the circumstances in which it might
apply, and (3) find language to speci-
fy all those but only those circum-
stances. Each task is ultimately im-
possible, which is why statutes explic-
itly or implicitly confide their en-
forcers with some discretion and why
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courts must interpret—rewrite?—
statutes. However, these skills and re-
sources are not available to physicians
or surrogates.
One might retort that property
wills work and that living wills are not
that far removed from property wills.
But wills work as well as they do to
distribute property because their
scope is—compared to living wills—
narrow and routinized. Most people
have little property to distribute and
few plausible heirs. As property accu-
mulates and ambitions swell, prob-
lems proliferate. Many of them are re-
solvable because experts—lawyers—
exclusively draft and interpret wills.
Lawyers have been experimenting for
centuries with testamentary language
in a process which has produced stan-
dard formulas with predictable mean-
ings and standard ways of distributing
property into which testators are
channeled. Finally, if testators didn’t
say it clearly enough in the right
words and following the right proce-
dures, courts coolly ignore their wish-
es and substitute default rules.
The lamentable history of the liv-
ing will demonstrates just how recal-
citrant these problems are. There have
been, essentially, three generations of
living wills. At first, they stated fatu-
ously general desires in absurdly gen-
eral terms. As the vacuity of over-gen-
erality became clear, advocates of liv-
ing wills did the obvious: Were living
wills too general? Make them specific.
Were they “one size fits all”? Make
them elaborate questionnaires. Were
they uncritically signed? “Require”
probing discussions between doctor
and patient. However, the demand
for specificity forced patients to ad-
dress more questions than they could
comprehend. So, generalities were in-
sufficiently specific and insufficiently
considered. Specifics were insuffi-
ciently general and perhaps still insuf-
ficiently considered. What was a doc-
tor—or lawyer—to do? Behold the
“values history,” a disquisition on the
patient’s supposed overarching beliefs
from which to infer answers to specif-
ic questions.74 That patients can be
induced to trek through these inter-
minable and imponderable docu-
ments is unproved and unlikely. That
useful conclusions can be drawn from
the platitudes they evoke is false. As
Justice Holmes knew, “General
propositions do not decide concrete
cases.”75
The lessons of this story are that
drafting instructions is harder than
proponents of living wills seem to be-
lieve and that when you move toward
one blessing in structuring these doc-
uments, you walk away from another.
The failure to devise workable forms
is not a failure of effort or intelli-
gence. It is a consequence of attempt-
ing the impossible.
Where Is the Living Will?
Suppose that, mirabile dictu, peopleexecuted living wills, knew what
they will want, and could say it. That
will not matter unless the living will
reaches the people responsible for the
incompetent patient. Often, it does
not. This should be no surprise, for
long can be the road from the
drafteer’s chair to the ICU bed.
First, the living will may be signed
years before it is used, and its exis-
tence and location may vanish in the
mists of time.76 Roughly half of all
living wills are drawn up by lawyers
and must somehow reach the hospi-
tal, and 62 percent of patients do not
give their living will to their physi-
cian.77 On admission to the hospital,
patients can be too assailed and anx-
ious to recall and mention their ad-
vance directives.78 Admission clerks
can be harried, neglectful, and loath
to ask patients awkward questions.
Thus when a team of researchers
reviewed the charts of 182 patients
who had completed a living will be-
fore being hospitalized, they found
that only 26 percent of the charts ac-
curately recorded information about
those directives,79 and only 16 per-
cent of the charts contained the form.
And in another study only 35 percent
of the nursing home patients who
were transferred to the hospital had
their living wills with them.80
Will Proxies Read It
Accurately?
Suppose, per impossibile, that pa-tients wrote living wills, correctly
anticipated their preferences, articu-
lated their desires lucidly, and con-
veyed their document to its inter-
preters. How acutely will the inter-
preters analyze their instructions? Liv-
ing wills are not self-executing: some-
Were living wills too general? Make them specific. Were they “one size fits
all”? Make them elaborate questionnaires. Were they uncritically signed? “Re-
quire” probing discussions between doctor and patient. . . .
Behold the “values history.”
36 H A S T I N G S  C E N T E R  R E P O R T March-April 2004
one must decide whether the patient
is incompetent, whether a medical
situation described in the living will
has arisen, and what the living will
then commands.
Usually, the patient’s intimates will
be central among a living will’s inter-
preters. We might hope that intimates
already know the patient’s mind, so
that only modest demands need be
made on their interpreting skills. But
many studies have asked such surro-
gates to predict what treatment the
patient would choose.81 Across these
studies, approximately 70 percent of
the predictions were correct—not in-
spiring success for life and death deci-
sions.
Do living wills help? We know of
only one study that addresses that
question. In a randomized trial, re-
searchers asked elderly patients to
complete a disease- and treatment-
based or a value-based living will.82 A
control group of elderly patients com-
pleted no living will. The surrogates
were generally spouses or children
who had known the patient for
decades. Surrogates who were not
able to consult their loved one’s living
will predicted patients’ preferences
about 70 percent of the time. Strik-
ingly, surrogates who consulted the
living will did no better than surro-
gates denied it. Nor were surrogates
more successful when they discussed
living wills with patients just before
their prediction.
What is more, a similar study
found that primary care physicians’
predictions were similarly unim-
proved by providing them with pa-
tients’ advance directives.83 On the
other hand, emergency room doctors
(complete strangers) given a living
will more accurately predicted pa-
tients’ preferences than ER doctors
without one.84
Do Living Wills Alter Patient
Care?
Our survey of the mounting em-pirical evidence shows that none
of the five requisites to making living
wills successful social policy is met
now or is likely to be. The program
has failed, and indeed is impossible.
That impossibility is confirmed by
studies of how living wills are imple-
mented, which show that living wills
seem not to affect patients’ treat-
ments. For instance, one study con-
cluded that living wills “do not influ-
ence the level of medical care overall.
This finding was manifested in the
quantitatively equal use of diagnostic
testing, operations, and invasive he-
modynamic monitoring among pa-
tients with and without advance di-
rectives. Hospital and ICU lengths of
stay, as well as health care costs, were
also similar for patients with and
without advance directive state-
ments.”85 Another study found that
in thirty of thirty-nine cases in which
a patient was incompetent and the
living will was in the patient’s medical
record, the surrogate decisionmaker
was not the person the patient had
appointed.86 In yet a third study, a
quarter of the patients received care
that was inconsistent with their living
will.87
But all this is normal. Harry Tru-
man rightly predicted that his succes-
sor would “sit here, and he’ll say, ‘Do
this! Do that!’ And nothing will hap-
pen. Poor Ike—it won’t be a bit like
the army. He’ll find it very frustrat-
ing.” (Of course, the army isn’t like
the army either, as Captain Truman
surely knew.) Indeed, the whole law
of bioethics often seems a whited
sepulchre for slaughtered hopes, for
its policies have repeatedly fallen woe-
fully short of their purposes. In-
formed consent is a “fairytale.”88 Pro-
grams to increase organ donation
have persistently disappointed. Laws
regulating DNR orders are hardly
better. Legal definitions of brain
death are misunderstood by astonish-
ing numbers of doctors and nurses.
And so on.89
But why don’t living wills affect
care?90 Joan Teno and colleagues saw
no evidence “that a physician unilat-
erally decided to ignore or disregard
an AD.” Rather, there was “a complex
interaction of . . . three themes.” First
(as we have emphasized), “the con-
tents of ADs were vague and difficult
to apply to current clinical situa-
tions.” The imprecision of living wills
not only stymies interpreters, it exac-
erbates their natural tendency to read
documents in light of their own pref-
erences. Thus “(e)ven with the thera-
py-specific AD accompanied by des-
ignation of a proxy and prior patient-
physician discussion, the proportion
of physicians who were willing to
withhold therapies was quite variable:
cardiopulmonary resuscitation,
100%; administration of artificial nu-
trition and hydration, 82%; adminis-
tration of antibiotics, 80%; simple
tests, 70%; and administration of
pain medication, 13%.”91
Second, the Teno team found that
“patients were not seen as ‘absolutely,
hopelessly ill,’ and thus, it was never
considered the time to invoke the
AD.” Living wills typically operate
when patients become terminally ill,
but neither doctors nor families light-
ly conclude patients are dying, espe-
cially when that means ending treat-
ment. And understandably. For in-
stance, “on the day before death, the
median prognosis for patients with
heart failure is still a 50% chance to
live 6 more months because patients
with heart failure typically die quickly
from an unpredictable complication
like arrhythmia or infection.”92 So by
the time doctors and families finally
conclude the patient is dying, the pa-
tient’s condition is already so dire that
treatment looks pointless quite apart
from any living will. “In all cases in
which life-sustaining treatment was
withheld or withdrawn, this decision
was made after a trial of life-sustain-
ing treatment and at a time when the
patient was seen as ‘absolutely, hope-
lessly ill’ or ‘actively dying.’ Until pa-
tients crossed this threshold, ADs
were not seen as applicable.” Thus “it
is not surprising that our previous re-
search has shown that those with ADs
did not differ in timing of DNR or-
ders or patterns of resource utilization
from those without ADs.”93
Third, “family members or the
surrogate designated in a [durable
power of attorney] were not available,
were ineffectual, or were over-
whelmed with their own concerns
and did not effectively advocate for
the patient.” Family members are
crucial surrogates because they should
be: patients commonly want them to
be; they commonly want to be; they
specially cherish the patient’s inter-
ests. Doctors ordinarily assume fami-
lies know the patient’s situation and
preferences and may not relish re-
sponsibility for life-and-death deci-
sions, and doctors intent on avoiding
litigation may realize that the only
plausible plaintiffs are families. The
family, however, may not direct atten-
tion to the advance directive and may
not insist on its enforcement. In fact,
surrogates may be guided by either
their own treatment preferences or an
urgent desire to keep their beloved
alive.94
In sum, not only are we awash in
evidence that the prerequisites for a
successful living wills policy are un-
achievable, but there is direct evi-
dence that living wills regularly fail to
have their intended effect. That fail-
ure is confirmed by the numerous
convincing explanations for it. And if
living wills do not affect treatment,
they do not work.
Do Living Wills Have Beneficial
Side Effects?
Even if living wills do not effective-ly promote patients’ autonomy,
they might have other benefits that
justify their costs. There are three
promising candidates.
First, living wills might stimulate
conversation between doctor and pa-
tient about terminal treatment. How-
ever, at least one study finds little as-
sociation between patients’ reports of
executing an advance directive and
their reports of such conversations.95
Nor do these conversations, when
they occur, appear satisfactory.96
James Tulsky and colleagues asked ex-
perienced clinicians who had rela-
tionships with patients who were over
sixty-five or seriously ill to “discuss
advance directives in whatever way
you think is appropriate” with them.
Although the doctors knew they were
being taped, the conversations were
impressively short and one-sided: The
median discussion “lasted 5.6 min-
utes (range, 0.9 to 15.0 minutes.)
Physicians spoke for a median of 3.9
minutes (range, 0.6 to 10.9 minutes),
and patients spoke for the remaining
1.7 minutes (range, 0.3 to 9.6 min-
utes). . . . Usually, the conversation
ended without any specific follow-up
plan.” The “(p)atients’ personal val-
ues, goals for care, and reasons for
treatment preferences were discussed
in 71% of cases and were explicitly
elicited by 34% of physicians.” But
doctors commonly “did not explore
the reasons for patient’s preferences
and merely determined whether they
wanted specific interventions.”97
Nor were the conversations con-
spicuously informative: “Physicians
used vague language to describe sce-
narios, asking what patients would
want if they became ‘very, very sick’
or ‘had something that was very seri-
ous.’ . . .” Further, “[v]arious quali-
tative terms were used loosely to de-
scribe outcome probabilities.” In ad-
dition, these brief conversations con-
sidered almost exclusively the two
ends of the continuum—the most
hopeless and the most hopeful cases.
Conversations tended to ignore “the
more common, less clear-cut predica-
ments surrounding end-of-life care.”
True, the patients all thought “their
physicians ‘did a good job talking
about the issues,’” but this only sug-
gests that patients did not understand
how little they were told.
The second candidate for benefi-
cial side effect arises from evidence
that living wills may comfort patients
and surrogates. People with a living
will apparently gain confidence that
their surrogates will understand their
preferences and will implement them
comfortably, and the surrogates con-
cur.98 Improved satisfaction with de-
cisions was also a rare positive effect
of the SUPPORT study (which de-
voted enormous resources to improv-
ing end of life decisions and care but
made dismayingly little difference).99
In another study, living wills reduced
the stress and unhappiness of family
members who had recently with-
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drawn life support from a relative.100
But even if living wills make patients
and surrogates more confident and
comfortable, those qualities are ap-
parently unrelated to the accuracy of
surrogates’ decisions. Thus we are left
with the irony that one of the best ar-
guments for a tool for enhancing
people’s autonomy is that it deceives
them into confidence.
Third, because living wills general-
ly constrain treatment, they might re-
duce the onerous costs of terminal ill-
ness. Although several studies associ-
ated living wills with small decreases
in those costs,101 several studies have
reached the opposite conclusion.102
The old Scotch verdict, “not proven,”
seems apt.
The Costs
There is no free living will, and thebetter (or at least more thorough
and careful) the living will, the more
it costs. Living wills consume pa-
tient’s time and energy. When doctors
or lawyers help, costs soar. On a
broader view, Jeremy Sugarman and
colleagues estimated that the Patient
Self-Determination Act imposed on
all hospitals a start-up cost of
$101,569,922 and imposed on one
hospital (Johns Hopkins) initial costs
of $114,528.103 These figures omit
the expenses, paid even as we write
and you read, of administering the
program. And this money has bought
only pro forma compliance.
These are real costs incurred when
over 40 million people lack health in-
surance and when we are spending
more of our gross domestic product
on health care than comparable
countries without buying commen-
surately better health. If programs to
promote and provide living wills
showed signs of achieving the goals
cherished for them, we would have to
decide whether their valuable but in-
calculable rewards exceeded their dif-
fuse but daunting costs. However,
since those programs have failed,
their costs plainly outweigh their
benefits.
What Is To Be Done?
Living wills attempt what under-takers like to call “pre-need plan-
ning,” and on inspection they are as
otiose as the mortuary version. Criti-
cally, empiricists cannot show that
advance directives affect care. This is
damning, but were it our only evi-
dence, perhaps we might not be
weary in well doing: for in due season
we might reap, if we faint not. How-
ever, our survey of the evidence sug-
gests that living wills fail not for want
of effort, or education, or intelli-
gence, or good will, but because of
stubborn traits of human psychology
and persistent features of social orga-
nization.
Thus when we reviewed the five
conditions for a successful program
of living wills, we encountered evi-
dence that not one condition has
been achieved or, we think, can be.
First, despite the millions of dollars
lavished on propaganda, most people
do not have living wills. And they
often have considered and consider-
able reasons for their choice. Second,
people who sign living wills have gen-
erally not thought through its in-
structions in a way we should want
for life-and-death decisions. Nor can
we expect people to make thoughtful
and stable decisions about so complex
a question so far in the future. Third,
drafters of living wills have failed to
offer people the means to articulate
their preferences accurately. And the
fault lies primarily not with the
drafters; it lies with the inherent im-
possibility of living wills’ task.
Fourth, living wills too often do not
reach the people actually making de-
cisions for incompetent patients. This
is the most remediable of the five
problems, but it is remediable only
with unsustainable effort and unjusti-
fiable expense. Fifth, living wills seem
not to increase the accuracy with
which surrogates identify patients’
preferences. And the reasons we sur-
veyed when we explained why living
wills do not affect patients’ care sug-
gest that these problems are insur-
mountable.
The cost-benefit analysis here is
simple: If living wills lack detectable
benefits, they cannot justify any cost,
much less the considerable costs they
now exact. Any attempt to increase
their incidence and their availability
to surrogates must be expensive. And
the evidence suggests that broader use
of living wills can actually disserve
rather than promote patients’ auton-
omy: If, as we have argued, patients
Patients anxious to control future medical decisions should be told about
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sign living wills without adequate re-
flection, lack necessary information,
and have fluctuating preferences any-
way, then living wills will not lead
surrogates to make the choices pa-
tients would have wanted. Thus, as
Pope suggests, the “PSDA, rather
than promoting autonomy has ‘done
a disservice to most real patients and
their families and caregivers.’ It has
promoted the execution of unin-
formed and under-informed advance
directives, and has undermined, not
protected, self-determination.”104
If living wills have failed, we must
say so. We must say so to patients. If
we believe our declamations about
truth-telling, we should frankly warn
patients how faint is the chance that
living wills can have their intended
effect. More broadly, we should ab-
jure programs intended to cajole
everyone into signing living wills. We
should also repeal the PSDA, which
was passed with arrant and arrogant
indifference to its effectiveness and its
costs and which today imposes accu-
mulating paperwork and administra-
tive expense for paltry rewards.105
Of course we recognize the prob-
lems presented by the decisions that
must be made for incompetent pa-
tients, and our counsel is not wholly
negative. Patients anxious to control
future medical decisions should be
told about durable powers of attor-
ney. These surely do not guarantee
patients that their wishes will blos-
som into fact, but nothing does.
What matters is that powers of attor-
ney have advantages over living wills.
First, the choices that powers of attor-
ney demand of patients are relatively
few, familiar, and simple. Second, a
regime of powers of attorney requires
little change from current practice, in
which family members ordinarily act
informally for incompetent patients.
Third, powers of attorney probably
improve decisions for patients, since
surrogates know more at the time of
the decision than patients can know
in advance. Fourth, powers of attor-
ney are cheap; they require only a
simple form easily filled out with lit-
tle advice. Fifth, powers of attorney
can be supplemented by legislation
(already in force in some states) akin
to statutes of intestacy. These statutes
specify who is to act for incompetent
patients who have not specified a sur-
rogate. In short, durable powers of at-
torney are—as these things go—sim-
ple, direct, modest, straightforward,
and thrifty.
In social policy as in medicine,
plausible notions can turn out to be
bad ideas. Bad ideas should be re-
nounced. Bloodletting once seemed
plausible, but when it demonstrably
failed, the course of wisdom was to
abandon it, not to insist on its virtues
and to scrounge for alternative justifi-
cations for it. Living wills were
praised and peddled before they were
fully developed, much less studied.
They have now failed repeated tests
of practice. It is time to say,
“enough.”
Disclaimer
This report and its conclusions are
the opinions of the authors and do not
necessarily represent those of the De-
partment of Veterans Affairs.
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